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ABSTRACT 
 
It is sometimes argued that tolerance for corruption is universally low, i.e. that corruption is 
shunned among all individuals, in all societies and cultures. Against this backdrop, this paper 
engages in two interrelated tasks: to descriptively map variations in corruption tolerance in 
two low-corrupt countries, and exploratively identify factors that influence tolerance of cor-
ruption at the individual level. We note that although corruption tends to be widely disliked, 
there are shades to this dislike. In particular, three results stand out from our analyses. First, 
we reject the ‘pureness of the people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’-hypothesis, observing that if 
anything, politicians are less tolerant of corruption than the general public. Second, we find 
striking differences in corruption tolerance between such homogenous, low-corrupt and in 
other respects such similar nations as Iceland and Sweden; differences we argue could be 
traced back to their different paths to representative democracy and strong state-capacity 
respectively. Third, analysing within-country variations in these countries, we observe that 
civil-servants generally tend to have a lower tolerance for corruption than do e.g. the ‘ordi-
nary public’ and ‘politicians’. This last result lends strength to the argument that bureaucracy 
and professional civil-servants should be given discretion and a high degree of autonomy 
from the influence of politicians to be able to lend support to a credible commitment to 
non-corruption.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
Gissur Ólafur Erlingsson 
Centre for Municipality Studies 
Linköping University, Sweden 
gissur.erlingsson@liu.se 
Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson 
Department of Political Science 
University of Iceland, Iceland 
ghk@hi.is 
  
  3 
I. Introduction 
The last two decades have seen burgeoning interest in corruption research across academic disci-
plines and regions of the world (e.g. Rothstein and Varraich 2017). Governments and international 
organizations have placed the fight against corruption high on the agenda, and various guidelines 
have been developed to signal the way to higher ethics in public life. In academia, the availability of 
international measurements – e.g. TI and World Bank – has contributed to a growing body of re-
search on corruption issues. A challenging and controversial strand in this growing body of re-
search concerns the role played by ‘culture’, ‘values’ and ‘norms’ in promoting, preserving or pro-
hibiting corruption. A particularly provocative question is whether it may be possible that corrup-
tion reflects a particular cultural orientation, in the spirit of de Maistre’s dictum that ‘every nation 
gets the government it deserves’.  
From this point of view, it is worth noting that corruption tolerance is widely assumed to be associ-
ated with corruption, based either on ignorance of the true laws of ethics or unwillingness to heed 
them (e.g. Bierstaker 2009; Fishman & Miguel 2007). Given that levels of corruption tolerance are 
important, it is no accident that scholars such as Levi and Rothstein (2018) have argued that we 
need to make sure that future decision-makers – among others, politicians and key civil-servants – 
are properly ethically equipped to make collectively binding decisions; and for that reason, Levi and 
Rothstein proposed that all institutions of higher education should adapt their training in order to 
instill ethical and critical thinking as well as skills to deal with ethical dilemmas (see also Becker et al 
2013). Additionally, in individual countries, ethical codes/codes of conduct have been introduced in 
order to strengthen public sector ethics (e.g. Gilman 2005).  
From this perspective, the literature on ‘administrative ethics’ is relevant for the debate on the rela-
tion between prevailing corruption levels and the tolerance of corruption within a given society. 
However, the administrative ethics literature tends to be either ‘positional’ (simply stating that civil 
servants’ values differ from other groups in society), ‘normative’ (identifying which values ought 
and should be embraced by civil servants), or ‘prescriptive’ (recommending what needs to be done 
so that the ethics of civil servants is strengthened). Empirically, however, there is not much to go 
by concerning neither the ethical standards of bureaucrats nor the effects of corruption tolerance 
on corruption levels. While there exists a handful of studies suggesting that corruption tolerance 
may be associated with corruption (e.g. Chang & Kerr 2017; Chang & Huang 2016), they remain 
  4 
rather few and far between. Against this backdrop, the present study aims at exploring the role of 
corruption tolerance in corruption. More specifically, the paper deals with four questions.  
First, we need to ask if variations in corruption tolerance are in fact substantial. It is well known 
that corruption is detrimental. It is bad for the economy, since it undercuts government revenue 
and limits governments’ possibilities to invest in public goods. In addition, corruption is likely to 
hamper economic development by discouraging entrepreneurship and innovation (e.g. Tanzi 1998). 
There is also compelling evidence that corruption undermines democracy by eroding vertical and 
horizontal trust, i.e. the foundations of social capital (Rothstein 2013) and trust in political institu-
tions (Linde & Erlingsson 2013). In addition, its effects are negative for population health as well as 
the subjective well-being of individuals (e.g. Uslaner & Rothstein 2016). These well-known disas-
trous consequences of corruption might give good reason to believe that tolerance of corruption is 
universally low. If anything, it is certainly true that there are no broad ideologies or political parties 
that publicly support corruption, whatever may be going on behind the scenes.  
If, on the other hand, there are non-negligible variations in corruption tolerance, our second ques-
tion must be: is corruption tolerance in some way associated with actual corruption levels? Even if 
corruption tolerance varies, it is not self-evident that such variations are associated to actual corrup-
tion levels in any meaningful sense. Institutional weakness and failure to enforce anti-corruption 
measures may, for instance, account for actual corruption levels, rather than corruption tolerance. 
In autocratic regimes, powerful elites may similarly be able to repress effective opposition to cor-
ruption. In modern democratic states, however, a strong association between corruption tolerance 
and actual levels of corruption calls for a more nuanced study than we have seen, hitherto, of how 
corruption tolerance takes shape and the role it plays in corruption.  
Our third question is therefore if we can provide a meaningful within-country account of corrup-
tion tolerance. Is it the case, for example, that despite ostensibly democratic forms of governance, 
there exists a corrupt elite which sustains corruption despite the opposition of a corruption-averse 
public? Current research indicates that the relationship between corruption and democracy is far 
from linear, in the sense that democracy does not provide a simple solution to problems of corrup-
tion (Bäck & Hadenius 2008). For instance, there are indications that the seriousness of the corrup-
tion problem is very different Greece and the United Kingdom, while the public’s tolerance for 
corruption is basically similar. What therefore seems needed, is a closer look at elite structures and 
patterns of elite-public relationships, when it comes to attitudes to corruption. 
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This leads to our fourth, and final, question, i.e. if we can provide meaningful country level expla-
nations of corruption tolerance. If corruption tolerance varies systematically within states among 
elite groups and the public, we still need to provide an account of how such patterns create system-
atic variations of corruption tolerance and actual corruption across states. While such variations 
most likely reflect long term variations in political development, the challenge is to develop ade-
quate hypotheses and methods for evaluating the validity of historical interpretations. We will at-
tempt to answer this question by looking closer at more detailed data from Iceland and Sweden, 
countries that had rather different paths to representative democracy and state-capacity respective-
ly. 
In what follows we address these questions tentatively and exploratively, rather than by construct-
ing a single model and subjecting it to a comprehensive test. The justification for such an approach, 
we maintain, lies in the lack of previous theorizing and limited empirical research in this area, espe-
cially research with a focus on highly developed democratic states. We start by refining our theoret-
ical expectations concerning our four main questions, and then delve deeper into the questions 
posed on the basis of data obtained from the European Social Survey (ESS) and some more de-
tailed data obtained from local level corruption research in Iceland and Sweden. Iceland and Swe-
den are given special attention on the basis of both being highly developed democratic states, which 
nonetheless vary to some extent in their experience of corruption. 
II. Theoretical considerations 
This paper aims at exploring the determinants of corruption tolerance, i.e. to at least tentatively 
unveil factors which seem to affect how individuals normatively evaluate abuse of power for private 
gain and other breaches of norms of impartiality. In this context, we define tolerance as the willing-
ness to accept or endure behaviors that tend to be generally shunned or disliked by the public. 
Variations in corruption tolerance 
Given the strong general case against corruption, the first step towards comprehension of why it 
might nonetheless be tolerated, is to consider the motivation behind an allowing attitude vis-à-vis 
corrupt behavior. The literature suggests three factors. Thus, acceptance of corruption may be mo-
tivated by 1) simple greed, i.e. taking advantage of opportunities, 2) by the perception that others 
are taking advantage of corruption (and individual non-compliance to acting corrupt will in fact 
change nothing regarding the prevalence of corruption), and 3) by the incentive structures and 
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norms prevalent in networks or demarcated bodies of people. The first is best understood from a 
rational choice approach, the second by the collective action problem, and the third by the concept 
of ‘embedded networks’.  
The rational choice perspective is perhaps the most established of the three, seeking explanations 
for corruption in the structure of opportunities presenting themselves. According to this, taking 
part in corrupt activity has nothing to do with ‘tolerance’ per se, but solely with opportunities is 
hence the result of simple cost-benefit calculations, where people weigh the potential costs against 
perceived costs and risks of getting caught; here norms and values are therefore largely irrelevan). 
This is the broad gist in arguments raised by scholars such as Becker (1968), Klitgard (1998) and 
Jain (2001), i.e. that corruption will result from cost-benefit calculations where the structure of 
opportunities (potential benefits weighted against risks) come out in favor of corruption (see also 
Andersson & Erlingsson 2012). An important version of the rational perspective is principal-agent 
theory, based on the assumption that agents are generally self-interested actors likely to fall prey to 
temptations when facing moral hazard. Closeness to power should, according to these assumptions, 
contribute to a lenient attitude towards corruption. Assuming that elites hold the key to power in 
democratic government we should expect them to be more tolerant of corruption than the public, 
which suffers the cost of corruption without similar opportunities to take advantage of it. We have, 
according to such a theoretical premise, something resembling the populist scenario where ‘corrupt 
elites’ are posed against the ‘pure people’; e.g. the rhetorical figure described in Ziller & Schübel 
(2015); alternatively, some version of the recurring ‘power corrupts’-hypothesis (e.g. DeCelles et al 
2012). 
An alternative attempt at grappling the relationship between corruption tolerance and corruption – 
still within a broadly rational framework – is to approach it as a collective action problem (e.g. 
Rothstein 2011; Persson et al 2013). If we regard corruption as resulting from a ‘pure’ collective 
action problem, we assume that those who wish to get rid of corruption fail to act in accordance 
with their wishes because of the belief that changing their own behavior will fail to bring about 
sufficient change in their position (benefits) to justify action. Hence, they are likely to take ad-
vantages of corruption opportunities – or at least endure the corruption that is going on around 
them – despite their nobler instincts. As is often said about the NYC police man Frank Serpico – it 
is rather tough to be the only cop in town; hence, even non-tolerant individuals comply with cor-
ruption norms, making societies stuck in what Rothstein has labeled ‘a social trap’ (Rothstein 2005). 
The collective action approach is consistent with the contention that corruption can persist in the 
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absence of corruption tolerance. In their book Making sense of corruption, Rothstein & Varraich (2017: 
46ff), discuss an intimately related topic, and reject the idea that corruption tolerance makes a sig-
nificant contribution to corruption:  
 
...corruption is seen by many as a relativistic concept where culture, history and language play 
a role in how the term is understood. However, such an analysis ignores the fact that corrup-
tion appears to be something that all societies shun and that it is not confined to the Western 
states.  
Rothstein and Varraich then go on presenting evidence from the Afrobarometer, claiming that no 
matter what societies or culture one turns to, people generally tend to dislike corruption.1 Accord-
ing to the collective action approach, therefore, we expect little or no variations in the tolerance of 
corruption, even if corruption behaviour may vary. We expect it to be universally shunned. 
While the rational approach is based entirely on individual calculations, the collective action ap-
proach has an important game-theoretic element: evaluations of rationality are partly dependent on 
expectations concerning the behaviour of others. A third possibility exists, however, still within the 
framework of a broadly rational approach. Most forms of corruption are practiced in networks of 
people who benefit from it in one way or another. Those who benefit are insiders while those who 
do not are outsiders (Chang & Kerr 2017). But in a networked environment the division between 
beneficiary and loser may not necessarily follow the elite vs non-elite distinction. People’s tolerance 
of corruption may reflect the incentive structure of the particular networks which they belong to. 
Mass clientelism is an effective form of political organization which may involve large sections of 
both elites and the electorate competing for privileged access to selective goods and services (e.g 
Pittaoni 2001; Manzetti & Wilson 2007). Experience of vote buying tends to reduce disapproval of 
such practices even where they are recognized to be malevolent (Ocantos et al. 2014). Equally, 
                                                     
1 However, taking stock of Rothstein’s (2013) own arguments – at least the way we understand the gist in the mecha-
nisms of how the ‘fish rots from the head and down’-metaphor supposedly plays out – we in fact would expect some 
variations in corruption tolerance; and we would expect variations in ‘actual’ corruption corresponding to a significant 
extent to variations in corruption tolerance.  
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however, the incentive structures may be tilted against giving in to corruption temptations. This 
may happen, e.g. in a strongly professionalized context or where bureaucratic autonomy is under 
threat from politicization (Silberman 1993). For instance, ‘frowning’ as well as ‘fear of whistle-
blowing’ from low tolerance peers, implies higher social costs for individuals to engage in corrup-
tion (e.g. Bergh et al 2009). The proposed mechanism resembles what Granovetter (1978) dubbed 
‘thresholds models of collective behavior’, e.g. the more individuals engage in some behavior, or in 
our case, conform to some value, the more likely it is to lower the cost for others to participate in 
such action or embrace such values (see also Schelling 1971; Kuran 1997). As Bardhan (1997: 1331) 
puts it: ‘corruption represents an example of what are called frequency-dependent equilibria, and 
our expected gain from corruption depends crucially on the number of other people we expect to 
be corrupt’.  
In line with such arguments, and as hinted by e.g. Moriconi and Carvalho (2016) and Tavits (2010), 
the mere suspicion that tolerance of corruption might lead to social learning and hence have conta-
gious spillovers to actual behavior, stresses the need for developing more knowledge about corrup-
tion tolerance. The rational actor approach suggests that corruption tolerance is associated with 
closeness to power (elite vs non-elite) and the collective action approach (at least its social trap 
version) suggests it is universally shunned, the networked approach suggests that institutions and 
elite structures may be crucial in determining tolerance of corruption. The network approach is not 
necessarily antithetical to the other two. Preventing corruption may be considered a public good, 
given that broad consensus prevails concerning its malevolent effects on the societal level (e.g. 
Rose-Ackerman 1999). As in the case of other public goods, we are likely to find some mixture of 
rational egoists, conditional compliers and willing reformers (Ostrom 2000) in the case of corrup-
tion. Rational egoists will take advantage of corruption opportunities, while willing reformers will 
report and fight corruption given the opportunity. Conditional compliers may be opposed to cor-
ruption, but they are likely to comply with whichever norm that prevails. They are unlikely to lead 
the fight against corruption, but in a non-corrupt setting they will comply with non-corruption 
norms. Willing reformers are likely to be found among those who reap no benefits from corruption 
on the condition that they can solve collective action problems. This may occur in a number of 
circumstances, e.g. in anti-corruption reform parties, professional groups or in hierarchically struc-
tured groups whose power may be undermined by corruption, such as the judiciary or the bureau-
cracy. 
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Accounting for corruption tolerance 
If there are variations in corruption tolerance (which – of course – remains to be established), the 
question is how variations come about. We do not preclude the possibility that individual ethics 
may affect people’s tolerance of corruption. Indeed, we have found some evidence that intolerance 
of corruption may be associated with intolerance of other types of misconduct (Erlingsson & Kris-
tinsson 2018). However, individual variations in ethical standards are unlikely to provide satisfacto-
ry accounts of large scale variations in corruption tolerance. On the one hand, explained variance 
seems low and on the other they still leave us ignorant of the conditions fostering intolerance 
across social cohorts and networks and between countries. ‘Corruption is not a problem that sud-
denly appears in society,’ Moriconi and Carvalho (2016) write. ‘To become consolidated, ex-
pand and become natural, certain ideas and practices have to be tolerated, wheth-
er actively or passively, by members of the community.’ 
A similar point is made by Johnston (2005), who argues that different syndromes of corruption are 
associated with its growth in different contexts. Standards and norms of conduct are likely to de-
velop in accordance with the demands and practices which prevail in different spheres of society. 
The standards shaping political life under democracy are e.g. likely to be different, to some extent, 
from the standards shaping the behavior of public administrators (e.g. Aberbach et al. 1981). After 
all, politicians are in the business of attracting votes and gaining seats and may be subject to a whole 
range of demands which public administrators tend to escape. Civil servants, by the same token, are 
in the business of shaping rules and implementing public policies in an impartial manner, irrespec-
tive of the power-holders of the day or who may be at the receiving end of administrative decisions. 
In bureaucratic systems they are likely be evaluated according to proficiency rather than political 
expediency. Thus, there is an interesting strand in the public administration literature on ‘adminis-
trative ethics’, where we find numerous examples of normative arguments from scholars who state 
that civil servants ought to have higher ethical standards than the general public and politicians, i.e. 
that there should be a distinct bureaucratic ethos or a public administration ethics (cf. Goss 1996; 
Lundquist 1988; 1998). This literature suggests that we ought to expect lower tolerance for corrup-
tion among civil servants than for instance citizens and politicians, depending on e.g. self-selection, 
education, socialization at the work-place, and role-fulfilment. 
As relevant and interesting as the administrative ethics literature is, empirical demonstrations of 
whether there in fact are differences in ethical orientations between civil-servants on the one hand, 
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and politicians and the ordinary public on the other, remain rare. In other words, few studies have 
empirically put the administrative ethics-propositions to the test, whether bureaucrats in general do 
have different types of ethics than legislators and/or the general public; alternatively, if they plainly 
hold the same norms and values as everybody else.  
An exception here is Goss (1996) now more than 20-year-old study, in which he surveyed 778 civil 
servants in Colorado, USA, 46 elected members of the Senate, and 250 Colorado voters. Interest-
ingly, Goss indeed observed a separate public administration ethics; but, given the limited and con-
text-bound data, he concluded that ‘further research would be helpful’. Since we believe that ques-
tions relating to corruption tolerance have been somewhat neglected in the general literature on 
corruption and public administration, and because Goss’s data is more than twenty years old, lim-
ited and contextually bound to Colorado, USA, our study can be viewed as a continuation of his 
research-program. 
It is an established fact that state capacity/strong bureaucracy and representative democracy are 
essential for achieving good governance (e.g. Kaufman et al 2000; cf. D´Arcy 2015). But how the 
worlds of democracy and bureaucracy interact may vary a great deal; and here, timing and sequenc-
ing matter. In some democratic systems, politicians were originally seen as mere guests in power, 
with little direct access to patronage or the implementation side of policy. This, according to Sheft-
er (1994), was the case where bureaucracy developed before the advent of democracy; a characteris-
tic for many countries in Northern Europe and some regions in North America. Where bureaucra-
cy was underdeveloped at the time of democratization, on the other hand, politicians were likely to 
gain a much stronger position within the administrative system, even to the point of hindering the 
development of strong administrative norms or the development of a sufficient degree of bureau-
cratic autonomy to counteract clientelism. As Huntington (1968) observed: democratizing before 
developing an effective bureaucracy, may lead to differing outcomes compared to a situation where 
democracy was introduced after state-capacity. 
Introducing Iceland and Sweden: different paths to democracy and state capacity 
In the Icelandic and Swedish contexts, we have two relatively low-corrupt cases which share many 
of the cultural and constitutional features of highly developed democracies. Holding a large number 
of external variables constant, comparisons between the two may therefore contribute to our un-
derstanding of how tolerance of corruption is shaped. We argue, in what follows, that conditions 
for developing professional integrity, on the one hand, and the relative strength of political norms 
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vs. administrative norms on the other, were crucial factors in shaping different levels of tolerance 
for different forms of corruption in the two cases. 
Case 1: Iceland. The presence of corruption in Iceland has long been a contested issue. Early 
measurements by TI in the 2000s indicated that Iceland was among the least corrupt countries in 
the world, or even the least corrupt one (in 2005). This view was contested by a number of academ-
ics as well as large sections of the Icelandic population (for overviews of this debate and related 
literature, see e.g. Erlingsson et al 2016; Erlingsson and Kristinsson 2016). The TI’s CPI is likely to 
be seriously biased with regard to Iceland in at least two respects. In the first place, the type of cor-
ruption which takes place is usually confined to grey or less serious types of corruption, which the 
CPI does not cover adequately. Typical corruption in Iceland includes influence peddling, patron-
age appointments, pork-barrel, and similar forms. However, we rarely observe bribery or highly 
criminalized activity. Secondly, the CPI is strongly influenced by the perceptions of foreign business 
people who may not be particularly knowledgeable about such corruption that actually occurs and 
may be highly susceptible to the influence of superficial or journalistic evaluations of corruption. 
Thus, after the economic crash of 2008, Iceland fell out of the CPI top-ten for the first time (e.g. 8 
in 2009, 11 in 2010, 13 in 2011), even if there is no substantial evidence that corruption actually 
increased in this period. In fact, there is some evidence suggesting that corruption may have de-
creased in many areas during the last three or four decades following a strong reform trend focused 
on strengthening the rule of law and improving administrative procedure (e.g. Kristinsson 2012; 
Kristinsson & Matthíasson 2014). And, as for instance Erlingsson et al (2016) point out drawing on 
survey-data, even before the financial crisis of 2008 – i.e. at a time when Iceland occupied top posi-
tions in international indices of development, good government and control of corruption – a sub-
stantial share of the citizens viewed corruption among politicians as quite common. 
The roots of the Icelandic clientelism problem lies in the weaknesses of the administrative state 
during the crucial decades of state formation in the first decades of the 20th century. The admin-
istration had been part of the Danish state and enjoyed very little legitimacy or political support 
among the political forces pressing for independence. Thus, with the emergence of Home Rule in 
1904, an entirely new structure was established at the top levels of the administration subservient to 
the emerging political victors from the struggle for independence. The old administrative elite lost 
much of its former influence while the rising forces of class politics had little sympathy for the old 
privileged servants of the state. As soon as mass political parties began organizing – during the 
inter-war period – they adopted clientelistic methods of political organization, distributing political 
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favors in exchange for political support. This benefited, among others, the rural areas, which were 
overrepresented through the electoral system, and the clientelist networks of the main contenders 
for power, the conservative Independence Party and the rural Progressive Party. The Social Demo-
crats – much smaller than their Scandinavian counterparts – may have reaped some benefits from 
the system but the communists/left-socialists can be considered political outsiders, for the most 
part. There seems little doubt that considerable support existed for the patronage system, especially 
among the sections of the population which benefited, which includes the rural, less professional-
ized sections of the population as well as political insiders (Kristinsson 1993).  
Growing opposition to clientelism since the 1960s had roots in a number of different develop-
ments, including the liberalization of the economy, trends towards greater professionalization, and a 
more independent media. Greater opposition to clientelism made questionable political practices 
riskier than before and greater transparency increased the risk of being exposed. At the national 
level a dedicated effort has been made since the 1980s to improve administrative procedure, leading 
among other things to greater separation than before between the worlds of politics and admin-
istration. At the local level, however, more of the old practices still exist. The local administration is 
extremely weak in many places and highly politicized, with politicians engaging directly in adminis-
trative activities which in the neighboring countries would be seen as the exclusive domain of pro-
fessional administrators. 
If it is the case, like we have suggested, that people adopt their evaluations of norms and behavior 
to some extent to roles and prevailing practices we should expect a) marked differences in the nor-
mative evaluations of politicians and administrators and b) political norms to prevail to a high de-
gree in Icelandic local administration. 
 
Case 2: Sweden. For all intents and purposes, Iceland and Sweden are often described as quite 
similar in the comparative politics literature, being e.g. classified as mature democracies, and be-
longing to the ‘Nordic welfare model’. And precisely like Iceland, Sweden has continuously been 
ranked high in e.g. TIs CPI, never lower than the sixth least corrupt country in the world since the 
measure was launched in 1995; and always in top of the rankings when e.g. rule of law is being 
measured.  
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However, this has not always been the case. Swedish state-building and state-expansion is typically 
traced back to the 16th century, driven by warfare and military competition (cf. D’Arcy et al 2015). 
Scholars analyzing Sweden´s historical corruption records have pointed out that the system was 
clientelistic and rather corrupt up until in the first half of the 19th century. However, in Rothstein 
(2009), a story is told on how Sweden eradicated its corruption problem. By the end of the 19th 
century, long before the introduction of parliamentary democracy, corruption was basically eradi-
cated. The problem was – according to Rothstein – largely amended through a series of non-
incremental, quite dramatic – or to speak with the author himself - “big bang”-reforms, which in a 
short time-frame changed a somewhat flawed, corrupt and unprofessional bureaucracy into a We-
berian-type bureaucracy between 1855–1875. But not only (relatively) free from corruption. As 
D’Arcy et al. (2015) conclude, what happened with the Swedish state in 19th century meant that 
Sweden had become a highly effective state well before it became a ‘full-fledged’ democracy in 
1921.     
*** 
To sum up our expectations from the preceding discussion, if we are right about the importance of 
timing and sequencing, we expect there to be differences in normative evaluations between admin-
istrators and politicians, influenced by their different roles. Given different paths of political devel-
opment, we also expect the political norms to be much more prevalent in the Icelandic case than 
the Swedish one. Simultaneously, we expect administrative norms to be more prevalent in the Swe-
dish case. 
III. Data and method 
Our analysis proceeds in several parts. In the first place we establish whether there exist sufficient 
variations in corruption tolerance to warrant further study. We do this, using ESS data covering a 
large number of European states in 2004 – the year being chosen because of the inclusion of ques-
tions relevant to our project. 2 Secondly, we look for evidence that tolerance of corruption is related 
to actual corruption levels. Again, we use ESS data on corruption tolerance while we use data from 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) to evaluate corruption levels. The 
corruption data at this point of the analysis is concerned primarily with bribes.  Our aim at this 
                                                     
2 For technical detail, cf. http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/  
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point is to establish if rejection of corruption is universal or if there exist marked and meaningful 
variations, which can be seen as a test of the collective action hypothesis (i.e. that corruption is 
universally shunned). 
Aiming to establish (see below) that there exist sufficiently important variations in corruption toler-
ance, we need to find ways of studying them empirically on the basis of relevant data. For Iceland, 
we use data from municipal level corruption research which covers both the public and municipal 
elites (politicians and administrators). The Icelandic data was obtained in parallel surveys conducted 
by the Social Science Research Institute among the public, municipal employees and members of 
municipal councils.3  
Our first aim, using this data, is to find out whether the closeness to power hypothesis holds, i.e. if 
we find a pattern where elites are more accepting of corruption than the public, in accordance with 
the rational actor hypothesis. To that end we probe the Icelandic data for systematic differences in 
the attitudes of politicians, administrators and public towards corruption. Since bribes may not be 
the most common form of corruption in countries with relatively little corruption, we ask for re-
spondents’ attitudes to a number of different types of activities relating to various kinds of abuses 
of power for private gain (or to favor those one has ties to), without mentioning the word corrup-
tion.4 Respondents were first asked how common they thought a number of different types of cor-
ruption are and after that whether – or to what extent – such behavior is justifiable. The activity in 
question is described in Table 1. 
 
 
 
                                                     
3 Sample among public was 1502 and net response rate 66 percent. Among municipal employees and representatives 
the sample size was 302 and net response rate 70 percent. 
4 The problem with using only attitudes or experiences of bribery to corruption-related phenomena is that bribes may not 
be the most relevant type of corruption in all settings. In the North European setting, for example, very few people claim 
to have any experience of having been asked to pay bribes (cf. Bauhr & Oscarsson 2011; Erlingsson & Kristinsson 
2016). Other activities may be more relevant, what Papakostas (2009) has called ‘sophisticated’ corruption (cf. Girling 
1997). In the Icelandic corruption study of 2015, we asked respondents for their attitudes to, and experiences of several 
different types of corruption.  
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TABLE 1, (TYPES OF CORRUPTION: DESCRIPTION OF BEHAVIOR) 
Bribes If you think of the Icelandic municipalities, how common or rare do you think it is that politicians or public 
employees accept payments or special benefits for giving preferential treatment to those offering them? 
Embezzlement  
How often or rarely do you think politicians or public employees in the Icelandic municipalities embezzle funds 
or draw income in excess of what they are entitled to? 
Fraud 
How often or rarely do you think politicians or public employees in Icelandic municipalities conceal important 
information or intentionally give misleading information to avoid criticism? 
Extortion 
How often or rarely do you think politicians or public employees in Icelandic municipalities give in to treats of 
one kind or another? 
Favouritism 
How often or rarely do you think politicians or public employees in the Icelandic municipalities discriminate 
among applicants for jobs on the grounds of political connections, cronyism or nepotism? 
Private interests 
How often or rarely do you think politicians or public employees in Icelandic municipalities cultivate relations to 
influential interest groups or businesses in the community and serve their interests in local government? 
Note: Alternatives for answers on tolerance of these types of corruption were: 1 = intolerable, 2 = rather undesirable, 3 = can 
be all right, and 4 = all right. 
Finally, we turn to the analysis of why and how inter-elite tolerance of corruption may vary between 
different elite groups in different states. In this case we use data from both Iceland and Sweden 
obtained among municipal politicians and administrators. The Icelandic data is from the same sur-
vey we reported above while the Swedish data comes from a elite survey from 2012, where local 
top-politicians and high-level civil-servants in all of Sweden’s municipalities were asked questions 
about their perceptions of corruption in Swedish local government.5 
According to some of the literature reported above we expect political norms and administrative 
norms to differ. Administrators are expected to take a more principled stance towards potential 
corruption in accordance to the public interest while politicians are likely to be sensitive to how 
attentive participants in political life are to the task of serving voters. Hence, we subjected respond-
ents to two different vignettes and asked for their evaluations. In vignette 1 we sought to capture 
political norms. 
 
A member of the local council sits on the board of a company owned by the local authority 
and acts as deputy chair of a committee. He never reads minutes from meetings, almost 
                                                     
5 Approximately 2 800 individuals received the survey, and the response rate was 69 per cent. For more about the 
survey, see Statskontoret (2012).  
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never speaks and votes according to party lines. He receives payment for being on the 
board and only has to work half-time as a teacher – but still is comfortably off. How do 
you feel about this? 
To test administrative norms, the following line was fed to respondents: 
(Supposing that:) In deciding on the procurement of goods for the elementary school your 
municipality decides to buy from a more expensive local supplier even if there are compa-
nies elsewhere offering goods of equal quality at a better price. How do you feel about this? 
As indicated in the theoretical section above, we expect to find differences between the two groups 
as well as between the two countries. Political norms should be more strongly adhered to in both 
countries by politicians and administrative norms by administrators. Given the stronger prevalence 
of administrative norms in Sweden compared to the more politicized Icelandic context, we expect 
administrative norms to be stronger in Sweden and political ones in Iceland. 
IV. Results 
Variations in corruption tolerance? 
Let us turn to our first question: does tolerance of corruption vary? Are there any meaningful varia-
tions to be explained? Table 2 shows the results in the ESS 2004 round, when respondents were 
asked for their evaluations of ‘how wrong’ they think it is for public officials asking a favour/bribe 
for service. Bribes are an important, perhaps the best known and archetypical form of corruption, 
on which more data exists than for many other types. 
TABLE 2, (PUBLIC OFFICIAL ASKING FAVOUR/BRIBE IN RETURN FOR SERVICE, HOW WRONG) 
 % N 
Not wrong at all 1.3 527 
A bit wrong 3.2 1288 
Wrong 27.9 11121 
Seriously wrong 67.6 26967 
TOTAL 100.0 39903 
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Table 2 shows two interesting patterns. On the one hand, the collective action approach to corrup-
tion seems vindicated, in the sense that rejection of corruption is close to universal. Almost 95 per 
cent of respondents think it is wrong or seriously wrong if public officials ask for favours/bribes in 
return for services; a mere 1 per cent feel that it is not wrong at all. Thus, there is wide recognition 
of the harmful nature of corruption and we can safely assume that in an ideal world most people 
would like to get rid of it.  
No less interesting, however, is the fact that there are different shades to the prevailing rejection of 
corruption. To some, bribes are “a bit wrong”, to others merely “wrong” and to still others “seri-
ously wrong”. Given the option of choosing between “seriously wrong” and less decisive options, 
almost one out of three respondents choose milder options. Thus, table 2 seems to establish, with 
regard to a relatively serious form of corruption (e.g. Heidenheimer 1989), that tolerance of corrup-
tion varies somewhat. This also warrants posing the question if tolerance of corruption is related in 
meaningful ways to actual levels of corruption can be of interest.  
Association between corruption tolerance and corruption? 
A few previous studies have found interesting variations in corruption tolerance or tolerance for 
other types of unethical behaviour (e.g. Chang & Kerr 2017; Magnus et al. 2002). Moreover, there 
are some indications that corruption actually varies with tolerance levels (e.g. Fishman & Miguel 
2007). To illustrate this latter point, we stay with the example of bribes. In Graph 1, we display the 
relationship between Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, and the data on 
tolerance of bribes from the European Social Survey (ESS) in 2004. We take the CPI to be a rea-
sonable proxy for bribes even if it may be criticized on a number of accounts (e.g. Andersson & 
Heywood 2009) including neglect of other types of corruption.  
In Graph 1, we observe fairly strong correlations between tolerance of bribes and the evaluation of 
TI where the perceptions of experts of how common bribes are play a strong role. Tolerance of 
bribes is relatively low in all the Nordic countries, including both Iceland and Sweden, and these 
countries are perceived among the least corrupt countries at the time of measurement. Having ten-
tatively established a relationship of corruption tolerance to actual corruption, we still empirically 
need to elaborate on which mechanisms may be at work here. In what follows we start by looking 
at the ‘closeness to power’-hypothesis (e.g. a version of the ‘power corrupts’-argument), and then 
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move on to study the relationship between political and administrative norms to corruption toler-
ance. 
GRAPH 1, (TOLERANCE OF CORRUPTION AND PERCEIVED LEVELS OF CORRUPTION) 
 
Corruption perception index: 0 (no corruption) to 10 (high corruption) 
Tolerance of corruption: Scale from 1 (not wrong) to 4 (seriously wrong) 
Closeness to power: elite versus non-elite? 
For the Icelandic case, we have data which allows us to compare the attitudes of politicians, admin-
istrators and the public in Icelandic municipalities over a range of corruption issues (see table 3 
below). In order to simplify the presentation, we have constructed an index of corruption tolerance 
where answers on the six corruption items were projected on a scale from 0 (no tolerance of cor-
ruption) to 100 (full tolerance). 
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TABLE 3, (TOLERANCE OF CORRUPTION IN ICELANDIC MUNICIPALITIES (INDEX 0-100)) 
 Politicians Administrators Public 
Bribes 0.6 1.8 5.6 
Fraud 7.4 6.8 6.6 
Embezzlement 0.9 0.4 6.6 
Extortion 4.7 6.9 10.5 
Favoritism 7.6 6.3 11.5 
Private interests 20.7 11.9 18.6 
Index (mean) 7.1 5.4 10.9 
Note: for questionnaire items, see table 1 above.  
Table 3 shows rather low degrees of tolerance of corruption among all three groups in Iceland. 
However, the pattern that emerges does not fit principal-agent theory, as it was depicted in the 
theoretical section, well. On the contrary, the ‘purity’ of the public can definitely be questioned. The 
public is more tolerant of corruption than the two elite groups, while the elite group more directly 
accountable to the public, the politicians, is more tolerant of corruption than the administrators 
(although, obviously, the difference is neither large nor consistent). Least tolerant of corruption are 
the administrators, even if they have relatively direct access to power without bearing direct political 
accountability. This, we believe, is an interesting finding. It echoes what Goss (1996) found in this 
now more than 20-year-old study in the USA, depicting a ‘distinct public administration ethics’. We 
will have reasons to return to this topic below. 
Administrative and political norms: Iceland and Sweden 
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If the elite is in fact less tolerant of corruption than the public, as our findings suggest, and the part 
of the elite which is less directly accountable to voters is also less tolerant of corruption, we are left 
with the interesting issue of what shapes elite norms regarding corruption. We suggested above that 
administrative norms might be different from those associated with political life, while historical 
and institutional factors might influence the relative weight of different norms between countries. 
Administrators are likely to be more sensitive to administrative norms than politicians while the 
reverse hold for politicians. Given Iceland’s history of democratization before bureaucratization, 
moreover, we expect political norms to be more strongly adhered to in Iceland than Sweden among 
both administrators and politicians. In historically strong bureaucratic state of Sweden, by contrast, 
we expect administrative norms to prevail among both groups. The results are shown in table 4. 
TABLE 4, (POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE NORMS IN ICELAND AND SWEDEN) 
 
A. POLITICAL NORMS: ACCEPTABILITY OF COUNCIL MEMBERS NEGLECTING DUTIES 
 
Evaluation Iceland  Sweden  
 Administrators Politicians Administrators Politicians 
Unacceptable 
64.9 72.4 29.9 40.7 
Questionable but unacceptable 
31.1 24.8 17.6 18.2 
Questionable but acceptable 
2.7 1.9 36.1 30.7 
Acceptable 
1.4 1.0 16.4 12.8 
Total 
100 100 100 100 
 
B. ADMINISTRATIVE NORMS: ACCEPTABILITY OF LOCAL PREFERENCE IN PUBLIC PRO-
CUREMENT 
 
Evaluation Iceland  Sweden  
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 Administrators Politicians Administrators Politicians 
Unacceptable 
37.8 19.2 56.1 45.4 
Questionable but unacceptable 
27.0 33.9 24.8 24.6 
Questionable but acceptable 
29.7 43.1 12.0 22.1 
Acceptable 
5.4 3.7 7.0 7.9 
Total 
100 100 100 100 
 
The findings in Table 4 are striking and highly suggestive, considering the theoretical expectations 
we outlined. We find marked differences in the normative standards of politicians and administra-
tors in all cases, irrespective of country. Both in Sweden and Iceland, politicians are considerably 
more sensitive to breaches against ‘political norms’ and administrators to violations of ‘administra-
tive norms’. Furthermore, the differences between Iceland and Sweden are very markedly in the 
expected direction, with the Icelandic respondents among both politicians and administrators being 
more sensitive to ‘political norms’ while the Swedish respondents in both groups are more sensitive 
to ‘administrative norms’. The findings are basically in accordance with the theoretical expectations 
we formulated, based on the two countries’ different pathways to state-capacity and representative 
democracy respectively: if you construct a functioning bureaucracy and a strong state-capacity be-
fore the introduction of representative democracy, administrative norms will be strong. If repre-
sentative democracy precedes state-capacity, political norms will tend to dominate. 
V. Conclusions 
The aim here has been to explore tolerance of corruption, and more precisely, delve deeper into the 
factors which seem to determine how individuals normatively evaluate this problem. To give con-
text to the issue, as well as demonstrate the relevance of the research problem, we initially showed 
that between countries, non-negligible variations in corruption tolerance among individuals can be 
found, and that these seem to be associated with actual corruption levels even within a sample of 
relatively low-corrupt ESS-countries. We therefore went on to tentatively explore what may con-
tribute to the understanding of varying levels of corruption tolerance among individuals, by taking a 
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closer look at data collected from two in many ways similar countries that historically have been 
seen as exceptionally spared from the plagues of corruption: Iceland and Sweden. The main takea-
ways from the paper are the following: 
 Corruption tends to be disliked by most people. There are variations, nonetheless, in the 
intensity of corruption dislikes. In this sense we can speak of slight, but non-negligible var-
iations in corruption tolerance.  
 Variations in corruption tolerance are significantly related to actual levels of corruption at 
the country level (at least in the case of bribes). This gives cause to explore the relationship 
between the two: what mechanisms are at work, which may account for the relationship? 
 Being close to power – and with that, access to the ‘supply-side’ of corruption) – does not 
imply greater tolerance of corruption. Rather, at least from data gathered in the Icelandic 
setting, we can comparatively safely reject the hypothesis about the ‘pureness of the peo-
ple’ and the ‘corrupt elite’; and by implication, the ‘power corrupts’-hypothesis. In fact, if 
anything, the pattern indicates that the group most tolerant to diverse types of corruption, 
is the general public. 
 We observed interesting differences between Iceland and Sweden when it comes to ‘pro-
fessional ethics’: what we label ‘political norms’ are stronger in Iceland, while ‘administra-
tive norms’ are stronger in Sweden. We make the case that these striking differences be-
tween two rather similar settings can be attributed to the both nation’s differing trajectories 
in the timing of when state-capacity and representative democracy respectively were con-
solidated. An implication of this finding is, at least as a tentative working hypothesis, that 
that the strength of administrative norms in Sweden have provided an important defense 
against patronage and clientelism; a defense that historically has not been as strong in Ice-
land. 
 Lastly, in several of our analyses, when it comes to different forms of corruption, civil-
servants tend to be slightly less tolerant than e.g. politicians and citizens. Working hypothe-
ses to explain those findings could be that there is a a) self-selection to civil-service, b) their 
specific education and preparation for civil-service infuses them with greater ethical stand-
ards, and c) learning and socialization at the work place may reinforce these values.  
The last result, that civil servants tend to have lower tolerance for administrative corruption, than 
both the public as well as the politicians, has implications and needs to be elaborated on. It is worth 
remembering that in the 1970s and 1980s, strong claims from e.g. neoclassical economics and pub-
lic choice-theorists were made about bureaucracy being rigid, hopelessly ineffective and a costly 
dinosaur involved in a death struggle. As Olsen (2005) demonstrates, several scholars, think-tanks 
and interest organizations maintained that bureaucracy was ‘obsolescent, undesirable, and non-
viable form of administration and that there is an inevitable and irreversible paradigmatic shift to-
wards market- or network organization’.  
Proclaiming the death of bureaucracy may have been premature, though. The alternatives to the 
classical bureaucratic model have proved not been too attractive. A first observation is that a body 
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of literature has demonstrated that privatization and outsourcing of public services may have been 
detrimental to core democratic values such as transparency, accountability and public ethics (e.g. 
Hondeghem 1998; Fredericks 1999; Box et al 2001; Sands 2006). A second observation is that a 
growing number of empirical studies have demonstrated that the more autonomous bureaucracies 
are from politics, the better political systems tend to work in a number of dimensions (for example, 
better growth, lower corruption levels, etc, see e.g. Evans & Rauch 1999; Dahlström et al 2012; cf 
Fukuyama 2013; Grönnegaard Christensen 1999; Rothstein & Varraich 2017). In other words, there 
seems to be something to, or in, bureaucracies that promotes factors which are attractive and desira-
ble for the society as a whole.  
What could this something be? Some of the literature on corruption attempts to model it as either a 
principal-agent problem or a collective action problem. The weakness of the principal-agent model, 
at least according to our account, is that although people are unlikely to engage in corruption with-
out some kind of benefit from it, closeness to power seems not to be a sufficient condition for 
increasing tolerance of corruption. Indeed, the public may be more tolerant of corruption than civil 
servants. Similarly, if the collective action model is taken to mean that values and norms are irrele-
vant to actual corruption because of a universal rejection of it, this is not supported by our data. 
Tolerance of corruption varies, and they are related to actual corruption levels. Lacking from both 
accounts – principal-agent and collective action - is the notion that norms may actually matter. 
We do not make a strong claim here, i.e. that norms should been seen as the main determinants of 
behavior. The pattern is most likely more complicated than that. Norms are shaped by contexts as 
rules making sense of appropriate behavior for different roles and often maintained in a mixture of 
formal structure and informal networks. They are likely to adapt to some extent to established prac-
tices in different sphere of society. The norms appropriate from one sphere to another, however, 
are likely to differ. Norms which counterbalance the incentives of politicians to develop particular-
istic exchange relationships may often be found in well-organized bureaucracies. 
Thus, one interpretation, which at least tentatively receives some support in the data we present, is 
that there are characteristics at the individual civil servant-level that could make the connection be-
tween ‘autonomous bureaucracies’ and certain desirable societal outcomes intelligible. We saw it in 
Table 2, where the Icelandic data revealed that civil-servants are considerably less tolerant to differ-
ent practices related to the concept of corruption than politicians and the public. We saw it Table 
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6b, where civil-servants in both Sweden and Iceland, are considerably less prone to accept devia-
tions from the norm of impartiality in public procurement processes. In addition, although admit-
tedly not as clear-cut, data on Sweden from WWS (2014), has shown that public sector employees 
more often than private sector employees, think that it is never justifiable to accept a bribe.6 
As discussed in the paper’s introductory section, in the public administration literature, we find 
scholars who normatively argue that civil servants ought to have higher ethical standards than the 
general public and politicians, i.e. that there ought to be a distinct ‘bureaucratic ethos’ or a ‘public 
administration ethics’ (Buchanan 1996; Lundquist 1988; see e.g. the overview in Goss 1996). Relat-
ed to this, some scholars seem to – more or less explicitly – argue that there is a gap between the 
normative prescriptions on which ethics civil servants ought to have, and the ethics they de facto do 
have. Hence for instance Levi and Rothstein (2018) have proposed that all institutions of higher 
education should adapt their training in order to instill ethical thinking and critical thinking as well 
as skills to deal with ethical dilemmas. This is a widespread opinion also within the top-echelons of 
government in individual countries, where various kinds of ethical codes or codes of conduct have 
been introduced in order to strengthen public sector ethics (e.g. Gilman 2005). One must reasona-
bly assume that this is done because there is a widespread perception for the need of this, i.e. that 
the ethical compasses of civil servants are not well-calibrated enough. Our results indicate that the 
problem may perhaps be smaller than is thought, at least within the countries surveyed in this pa-
per. In Sweden and Iceland, we do observe slightly higher ethical standards among civil-servants 
than among politicians and ordinary citizens; indicating precisely what Goss (1996) dubbed a ‘dis-
tinct public administration ethics’. Following Miller (2000), this is a highly desirable thing. It implies 
that the citizens indeed seem to have hired managers with preferences distinct from their own, a 
state of affairs advocated by Miller. Giving bureaucracies autonomy and discretion increases the 
chances of the system having a credible commitment to neutrality, impersonality, efficiency and 
anti-corruption. 
From an anti-corruption perspective, our results, signal something intrinsically good. The criteria 
for good performance in a bureaucracy are very different from those prevailing in a politicized en-
vironment, where we would expect civil-servants to focus on professional competence and impar-
                                                     
6 Ca 71 percent of public sector employees state it is never acceptable to accept a bribe, while ca 66 percent of the 
private sector employees state the same thing. As an interesting side-note, in the same data, 66 percent of public sector 
employees state it is never justifiable to cheat on taxes, corresponding figure is ca 59 percent of private sector employ-
ees. 
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tiality, but where political elites may be tempted to find ways to extract surplus rents and give pay-
backs to lobbyists or their supporters (voters, constituency, donors/financiers). For anti-corruption 
purposes, and as argued in the so called ‘Quality of Government’-perspective (e.g. Dahlström et al 
2012), it is crucial that politicians should be kept at an arm’s length from civil-servants so that bu-
reaucracies are kept fairly autonomous from politicians. In this sense, the bureaucracy can become 
a necessary counterbalance to the power of politicians and, as suggested above, could be seen as a 
necessary component of a well-functioning democracy that is comparatively spared from corrup-
tion.  
 
REFERENCES 
Aberbach, Joel, Robert Putnam & Bert Rockman (1981). Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democ-
racies. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. 
Alesina, A., & Angeletos, G.-M. (2005). Corruption, inequality, and fairness. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 52(7), 1227-1244. 
Anderson, Christopher & Yuliya Tverdova (2003). Corruption, political allegiances, and attitudes 
toward government in contemporary democracies. American Journal of Political Science, 47:1, 91-109. 
Andersson, Staffan & Gissur Ó Erlingsson (2012). New Public Management and Danger Zones for 
Corruption, in Tänzler, Dirk et al. [eds.] The Social Construction of Corruption in Europe. London: Ash-
gate. 
Andersson, Staffan & Paul M Heywood (2009). The politics of perception: Use and abuse of trans-
parency international‘s approach to measuring corruption. Political Studies 57(4), 746–767. 
Bardhan, P (1997). Corruption and Development: A Review of the Issues.  Journal of Economic Litera-
ture, 35(3), 1320-1346. 
Bauhr, Monika & Henrik Oscarsson (2011). Svenska folkets syn på korruption, in Holmberg, Sören 
et al (eds) Lycksalighetens ö. Göteborg: SOM-institutet.  
  26 
Becker, Katharina, Christian Hause & Franz Kronthaler (2013). Fostering management education 
to deter corruption: what do students know about corruption and its legal consequences? Crime, 
Law and Social Change 60(2), 227–240. 
Bergh, Andreas, Gissur Ó Erlingsson, Richard Öhrvall & Mats Sjölin. (2016). A Clean House: Studies 
of Corruption in Sweden. Lund: Nordic Academic Press.   
Bergh, Andreas, Gissur Ó Erlingsson & Mats Sjölin (2009). Egoism, grupplojalitet och korruption i 
svensk kommunalpolitik: Lärdomar från spelteori och experimentell samhällsvetenskap. Statsveten-
skaplig Tidskrift 111(4),  
Bierstaker, James Loyd (2009). Differences in attitudes about fraud and corruption across culture: 
Theory, examples and recommendations. Cross Cultural Management: An international Juournal, 16:3, 
224-250. 
Buchanan, Allen (1996). Toward a Theory of the Ethics of Bureaucratic Organizations. Business 
Ethics Quarterly, 6(4), 419–440. 
Bäck, Hanna, and Axel Hadenius (2008) Democracy and state capacity: Exploring a J-Shaped rela-
tionship. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Istitutions, 21:1, 1-
24. 
Chang, Eric, & Kerr, Nicholas (2017). An insider-outsider theory of popular tolerance for corrupt 
politicians. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 30:1,67-84. 
Chang, Eric and Shich-hao Huang (2016). Corruption experience, corruption tolerance, and institu-
tional trust in East Asian democracies. Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 12:1, 27-44. 
Dahlström, Carl, Victor Lapuente & Jan Teorell (2012). Public administration around the world. In 
Holmberg, Sören & Bo Rothstein (eds.) Good Government: The Relevance of Political Science. Cheltenham: 
Edwar Elgar.  
D´Arcy, Michelle, Marina Nistotskaya & Robert Ellis (2015). State-building, democracy and taxa-
tion: Why Ireland will never be Sweden. University of Tokyo Journal of Law and Politics, 12, 110–123.  
  27 
DeCelles, K. A., DeRue, D. S., Margolis, J. D., & Ceranic, T. L. (2012). Does power corrupt or 
enable? When and why power facilitates self-interested behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology, 97(3), 
681-689. 
Erlingsson, Gissur Ó, Jonas Linde & Richard Öhrvall (2016). Distrust in Utopia? Public Percep-
tions of Corruption and Political Support in Iceland Before and after the Financial Crisis in 2008, 
Government and Opposition, 51(4), 553–579. 
Erlingsson, Gissur Ó & Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson (2016). Measuring Corruption: Whose Percep-
tions Should We Rely On?. Icelandic Review of Politics & Administration 12(2), 215–235. 
Erlingsson, Gissur Ó & Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson (2018). Tolerance and Corruption: Tentative 
Insights from the Low-corrupt Nordic setting. Paper presented at Midwestern Political Science 
Association annual Conference, Chicago, Palmer House Hilton, 1–4 april. 
Fishman, Raymond and Edward Miguel (2007). Corruption, norms and legal enforcement. Evi-
dence from diplomatic parking tickets. Journal of Political Economy 115(6), 1020–1048. 
Gatti, Roberta and Paternostro, Stefano & Rigolini, Jamele, Individual Attitudes Toward Corrup-
tion: Do Social Effects Matter? (2003). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3122. Available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=636542  
Gertz, Kathleen & Roger J Volkema (2001). Culture, perceived corruption, and economics. Business 
and Society, 40(1), 7–30.  
Gilman, Stuart C (2005). Ethics codes and codes of conduct as tools for promoting an ethical and professional 
public service: Comparative successes and lessons. Washington DC: World Bank. 
Girling, John (1997). Corruption, Capitalism, and Democracy. New York: Routledge. 
Goss, Robert P (1996). A distinct public administration ethics, Journal of Public Administration Research 
and Theory 6, 573–597. 
Goudie, AW & David Stasavage (1998). A framework for the analysis of corruption. Crime, Law and 
Social Change. 29(2–3), 113–159. 
  28 
Granovetter, Mark (1978). Threshold models of collective behavior. The American Journal of Sociology 
83(6), 1420-1443. 
Grigoryeva, Maria & Ross Matsueda (2014). Rational choice, deterrence, and crime: Sociological 
contributions. Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5690-2_410  
Heidenheimer, Arnold (1989). Perspectives on the perception of corruption. In Heidenheimer, 
Johnston and Levine (eds.) Political Corruption: A Handbook. New Brunswick: Transaction Pub-
lishers. 
Huntington, Samuel (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Johnston, Michael (2012). Corruption control in the United States: law, values, and the political 
foundations of reform. Internationazl Review of Administrative Sciences, 78:2, 329-345. 
Kleck, Gary, Brion Sever, Spencer Li & Marc Gertz (2005). The missing link in general deterrence 
research. Criminology, 43:3, 623-660. 
Kristinsson, Gunnar H. (1993). Embættismenn og stjórnmálamenn. Reykjavík: Heimskringla. 
Kristinsson, Gunnar H. (2012). Party patronage in Iceland: Rewards and control appointments. In 
P. Kopecky, P. Mair and M. Spirova (eds.) Party patronage and party government in European democracies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Kristinsson, Gunnar H. & Pétur B. Matthíasson (2014). Stjórnsýsluumbætur og árangur þeirra. 
Stjórnmál og stjórnsýsla, 10:2, 299-318. 
Kuran, Timur (1997). Private truths, public lies. The social consequences of preference falsification. Harvard: 
Harvard University Press.  
La Porta, Rafael , Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1999. The Qual-
ity of Government. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15 (1): 222-79. 
Levi, Lennart and Bo Rothstein (2018). “Educating ethical leaders and critical thinkers”, University 
World News 12 jan 2018. 
  29 
http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20180109150748260 
 
Linde, Jonas & Gissur Ó Erlingsson (2013). The Eroding Effect of Corruption on System Support 
in Sweden, Governance 26(4), 585–603. 
Lundquist, Lennart (1988). Byråkratisk etik. Lund: Studentlitteratur. 
Lundquist, Lennart (1998). Demokratins väktare. Lund: Studentlitteratur. 
Magnus, Jan, Victore Polterovich, Dimitri Danilov & Alexei Sovvotev (2002). Tolerance of cheat-
ing: An analysis across countires. The Journal of Economic Education, 33:2, 125-135. 
Manzetti, Luigi, & Carole Wilson (2007). Why do corrupt governments maintain public support. 
Comparative Political Studies, 40:8, 949-970. 
Miller, Gary (2000). Above politics: Credible commitment and efficiency in the design of public 
agencies. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 10(2), 289–327. 
Moriconi, Marcelo & Tiago Carvelho (2016). Social tolerance to corruption in Portugal. Portuguese 
Journal of Social Science, 15(2), 299–318 
Nagin, Daniel (2013). Deterrence: A review of the evidence by a criminologist for economists. An-
nual Review of Economics, 5:83-105. 
Ocantos, Ezeuiel, Chad de Jontge & David Nickerson (2014). The conditionality of vote-buying 
norms: Experimental evidence from Latin America. American Journal of Political Science, 58:1, 187-211. 
Persson, Anna, Bo Rothstein & Jan Teorell (2013) Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail - Systemic 
Corruption as a Collective Action Problem. Governance. 26(3), 449–471. 
Piattoni, Simona (2001). Clientelism, interests, and democratic representation. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 
Eisenstadt, S. N. & Luis Roniger (1984). Patrons, clients and friends. Interpersonal relations and the structure 
of trust in society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
  30 
Rothstein, Bo (2005). Social traps and the problem of trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Rothstein, Bo (2009). Creating political legitimacy: Electoral Democracy Versus Quality of Gov-
ernment. American Behavioral Scientist. 53(3) 
Rothstein, Bo (2011).  Anti-corruption: the indirect 'big bang' approach. Review of International Politi-
cal Economy, 18(2), 228–250. 
Rothstein, Bo (2013). Corruption and Social Trust: Why the Fish Rots from the Head Down. Social 
Research. 80(4): 1009-1032 
Rothstein, Bo & Aiysha Varraich (2017). Making sense of corruption. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1999). Corruption and government. Causes, consequences and reform. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Schelling, Thomas (1971). Dynamic models of segregation. Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 1, 143–
186.  
Shefter, Martin (1994). Political parties and the state. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Silberman, Bernard (1993). Cages of reason. The rise of the rational state in France, Japan, the 
United States, and Great Britain. Chicago: The University of Shicago Press. 
Sousa, Luis de, & Marcelo Moriconi (2013). Why voters do not throw the rascals out? – A concep-
tual framwork for analysis electoral punishment of corruption. Crime Law Social Change 60: 471-502. 
Statskontoret (2012). Köpta relationer: Om korruption i det kommunala Sverige. Stockholm: Statskontoret.  
Tanzi, Vito (1998). Corruption around the world: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures. IMF 
Staff Papers 45: 559. 
Tavits, Margit (2010). Why do people engage in corruption? The case of Estonia. Social Forces, 88(3), 
1257–1279. 
  31 
Uslaner, Eric M & Bo Rothstein (2016). The historical roots of corruption: State building, econom-
ic inequality, and mass education. Comparative Politics 48(2), 227–248.  
Warner, Carol M. (1997). Political parties and the opportunity costs of patronage. Party Politics, 3: 
533-548. 
Ziller, Conrad & Thomas Schübel (2015). „The Pure People” versus “the Corrupt Elite”? Political 
Corruption, Political Trust and the Success of Radical Right Parties in Europe.  
Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 25(3). 368–386.  
 
 
